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THE SCOPE OF IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE
Elizabeth Chambliss*
INTRODUCTION
Large law firms increasingly are hiring their own in-house coun-
sel to provide day-to-day ethics advice, monitor internal policies and
procedures, and respond to potential and actual malpractice claims
against the firm.' Driven by the growing incidence of claims against
lawyers2 and insurers' efforts to promote better risk management
within law firms, 3 the role of in-house counsel in law firms emerged in
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. Research for this Article was funded
by the Open Society Institute and the Program on the Legal Profession at Harvard
Law School. Special thanks to Bob Creamer, David Wilkins, and my colleagues at New
York Law School for their thoughtful advice on this project. Thanks also to William
T. Barker, Anthony Davis, Susan Fortney, Bruce Green, Leslie Levin, William J.
Linklater, Charles E. Lundberg, Kurt W. Melchior, John J. Mueller, Douglas
Richmond, Robert Rolfe, David Sasseville, John Steele, and William Wernz for helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
I See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors,
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIz. L. Rv. 559,
559-61 (2002) (examining the role of in-house counsel in thirty-two law firms);
Jonathan D. Glater, In a Complex World, Even Lawyers Need Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2004, at CI (reporting firms' increasing reliance on in-house counsel); see also Jerry
Crimmins, Bulk of Big Firms Have Own In-House Lawyer, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 5,
2004, at I (reporting that over half of fifty-six law firms surveyed by Altman Weil, a
management consulting firm, have their own in-house counsel); Jaime Levy, More
Firms See Benefit of Using In-House General Counsel, CHI. LAw., July 2004, at 28 (describ-
ing the increasing number of firms using in-house counsel).
2 SeeJonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor, Practical Benefits for the Mod-
en Law Firm, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHiCS 1011, 1018-24 (1994) (discussing the "growth in
the number and size of awards for legal malpractice"); Gary Taylor, Counsel to Firms
Goes In-House: Legal Costs Are Leading Firms, Like Their Clients, to Look Inside for Advice,
NAT'L LJ., July 18, 1994, at Al (same).
3 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 559-60, 590 (discussing the role of
the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society in promoting the position of "loss preven-
tion counsel").
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the early 1990s under a variety of titles4 and in most firms has been
formalized only within the past five to ten years.
5
Most observers view law firms' increasing reliance on in-house
counsel as a positive development. In addition to improving risk man-
agement and lowering the cost of liability insurance, 6 the presence of
firm counsel may improve the ethical climate of the firm. 7 Although
the role of firm counsel varies significantly from law firm to law firm,"
at its most robust it includes a wide range of proactive, compliance-
oriented activities, such as reviewing firm policies and procedures,
conducting lawyer and nonlawyer ethics training, and going door to
door to invite questions from firm members.9 Such activities may con-
tribute enormously to firm-wide compliance with professional
regulation.
At the same time, the role of firm counsel raises a number of
ethical and regulatory issues that are unique to the law firm context.
Issues of privilege and disclosure, in particular, are even more difficult
in the law firm context than in the corporate context (where they are
difficult enough) °1O For instance, what is the scope of the attorney-
client privilege between law firm in-house counsel and other members
of the firm? What is firm counsel's duty to disclose firm members'
misconduct to firm managers, clients and regulators? What is the
scope of firm counsel's liability for failure to disclose? The answers to
such questions will dramatically affect the developing role of firm
counsel as well as firms' investment in that role.
4 Id. at 565-66 (reporting the most common titles in a sample of thirty-two law
firms). Tides include "firm counsel," "general counsel," "ethics advisor," "professional
responsibility partner," "conflicts partner," and "loss prevention partner." id.; see also
Crimmins, supra note 1, at 24 (reporting the title "director of professional responsibil-
ity"); Levy, supra note 1, at 28 (reporting the title "claims counsel").
5 Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 559-69 (examining the evolution of in-
house advising from an informal, volunteer service to a formal, paid position).
6 See Glater, supra note 1 (reporting that having in-house counsel may result in
significant savings on liability insurance premiums); Levy, supra note 1, at 28.
7 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1028-38 (discussing the benefits of in-house ethics
counsel).
8 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 570-83 (discussing the sources of
variation between firms).
9 Id. at 573-76; see also Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, Inside an In-House Legal
Ethics Practice, 14 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 103, 105-08 (2000) (describ-
ing their own in-house practice).
10 There is a vast literature on the ethical duties and dilemmas of corporate in-
house counsel, much of it focusing on issues of privilege and disclosure. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1011
(1997) (stating that "the role of corporate counsel is among the most complex and
difficult of those functions performed by lawyers").
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This Article addresses the scope of the attorney-client privilege
between law firm in-house counsel and other members of the firm. It
focuses specifically on whether the privilege protects communications
with firm counsel regarding a claim or potential claim by a current
client of the firm. For instance, what if a partner runs into trouble
with a client and goes to firm in-house counsel for advice? Is such
advice privileged should the client later seek discovery? Or does the
firm's fiduciary duty to the client require the firm to disclose to the
client all internal communication relating to the representation?
There are, so far, three cases on the subject and all hold that the
firm cannot claim the privilege because of its fiduciary duty to the
client."1 Thus, while courts have held that law firms generally enjoy
the same attorney-client privilege as other organizations that use in-
house counsel,12 these cases establish a fiduciary exception13 for inter-
nal communication regarding a current client of the firm.
I argue that these "current-client" cases were wrongly decided, on
both analytical and policy grounds. As an analytical matter, I argue
that the cases conflate two separate issues: the law firm's fiduciary duty
to the client and in-house counsel's fiduciary duty to the firm.
To the extent that the denial of privilege is based on the law
firm's duty to the client, this denial logically should extend to any
attempt by the firm to prevent or assess client claims, including com-
munication with outside counsel. Such a rule would leave the firm
without recourse to privileged advice unless or until the firm or the
client terminated the representation. This would create perverse in-
11 See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d
283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrie,
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002); In re Sunrise Sec.
Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
12 See United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996); Nesse v. Pittman,
206 F.R.D. 325, 329 (D.D.C. 2002); Nesse v. Pittman, 202 F.R.D. 344, 352-53 (D.D.C.
2001) (recognizing both the attorney-client and work product privileges); Hertzog,
Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Lama Holding Co. v. Shearman & Sterling, No. 89 Civ. 3639 (KTD), 1991 WL
115052, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.June 17, 1991); see also Barbara S. Gillers, Preserving the Attorney
Client Privilege for the Advice of a Law Firm's In-House Counsel, THE PROF'L LAWYER, June
2000, at 107; Cathryn M. Sadler, Note, The Application of the Attorney Client Privilege to
Communications Between Lawyers Within the Same Firm: Evaluating United States v. Rowe,
30 ARIz. ST. LJ. 859 (1998) (discussing the scope of in-firm privilege).
13 See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971) (establishing a fiduciary exception to the corporate attorney-
client privilege in shareholder litigation); Paul R. Rice, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: Loss of Predictability Does Not Justify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 Bus. LAW, 735,
736-37 (2000) (discussing the expansion of the fiduciary exception beyond share-
holder litigation).
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centives for both clients and firms and would be inconsistent with law-
yers' right to defend themselves against client claims.'
4
To the extent that the denial of privilege is based on in-house
counsel's duty to the law firm, typically a conflict of interest arises only
by imputing the firm's duty to the client to in-house counsel as a
member of the firm. Thus, the denial of privilege is based not on the
firm's fiduciary duty to the client, as the cases suggest, but rather on
the strength of the arguments for imputed conflicts in this context.
Framed this way, I argue, the case for privilege is much stronger than
the cases reflect.
As a policy matter, I argue for broad protection of communica-
tion with law firm in-house counsel, including communication about
the representation of a current client of the firm. Such protection
would encourage firm members to seek early advice about their duties
to clients and to correct mistakes or lapses, if possible, to alleviate
harm. Broad protection of in-firm privilege also would encourage law
firms to pursue internal investigations where questions of misconduct
arise. Finally, broad protection of communication with in-house
counsel would encourage law firms to invest in and formalize the role
of firm counsel, which in turn would promote compliance with profes-
sional regulation.
Part I examines the justifications for in-firm privilege and the
scope of in-firm privilege for communication about nonclients. Part
II examines the cases involving communication about a current client
and criticizes the courts' reasoning in establishing a fiduciary excep-
tion. Part III explains how protecting the privilege, and promoting
reliance on in-house counsel, would improve risk management within
law firms to the benefit of clients and third parties as well as firms. I
conclude by discussing the implications of my argument for firm
counsel's duty of disclosure and liability for failure to disclose.
The Article builds on a recent study of in-house counsel in thirty-
two law firms.15 The study was based on focus groups and in-depth
interviews with in-house counsel in a nonrandom sample of firms
ranging in size from seventy-five to 1000-plus lawyers16 and headquar-
14 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (5) (2002); see also William T.
Barker, Law Firm In-House Attorney-Client Privilege Vis-ti-Vis Current Clients, 70 DEF.
COUNS. J. 467, 471 (2003) (raising a similar objection).
15 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note I (presenting the main findings of the
study).
16 The breakdown of firms by size category is 75-150 lawyers (five firms), 151-250
lawyers (six firms), 251-500 lawyers (ten firms), 501-1000 lawyers (seven firms), and
1000-plus lawyers (four firms). Id. at 561 n.17.
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tered in twelve different cities.17 These data were supplemented with
focus groups and interviews with bar leaders, liability insurers, and
lawyers who serve as outside counsel for law firms in ethics and profes-
sional liability matters.18 To preserve participants' anonymity, direct
quotes are referenced in the text by participant identification
number. 19
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communica-
tion between lawyers and their clients from discovery in litigation.
20 It
applies only to communication made for the purpose of securing legal
advice.21 The chief purpose of the privilege is "to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public 'interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice."22 Proponents of the privilege argue that,
without it, clients would be unwilling to disclose potentially damaging
17 The cities with more than one firm in the sample are New York City (ten
firms), Boston (six firms), Chicago (four firms), Philadelphia (three firms), and
Washington, D.C. (two firms). Id. at 561 n.18.
18 See id. at 561 n.15.
19 We labeled the focus groups A, B, and C and refer to participants in each focus
group by a unique number (e.g., Al, A2, B1, etc.). We refer to interview subjects with
the letter I and a unique number (e.g., I1, 12, etc.). See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra
note 1, at 561 nn.15-16.
20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAwYERS § 68 (2000)
(" [T]he attorney-client privilege may be invoked ... with respect to... (1) a commu-
nication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose
of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client."); see also United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communi-
cation relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing prima-
rily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.
Id.
21 See United Shoe Mach., 89 F. Supp. at 359-60.
22 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Timothy P.
Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 59, 69 (2002) (stating that "[t]he pre-
dominant modern rationale for the privilege is that it fosters client candor and full
communication between attorneys and clients, which produces social benefits that
outweigh the privilege's social costs").
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facts to their attorneys, and attorneys therefore would be unable to
offer sound legal advice.
23
It is well settled that corporations, partnerships and other organi-
zations can claim the attorney-client privilege.2 4 Although the ratio-
nale for the "corporate" privilege has arisen somewhat after the fact 25
and some scholars continue to question the justifications for the privi-
lege in an organizational context,26 the Supreme Court has endorsed
broad protection of the corporate privilege,27 and some form of cor-
porate privilege is recognized in every state.28 According to the Su-
preme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, broad protection of the
corporate privilege is needed to protect
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's
compliance with law. In light of the vast and complicated array of
regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corpo-
23 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 68 cmt. c
(stating that "[tihe rationale for the privilege is that confidentiality enhances the
value of lawyer-client communications and hence the efficacy of legal services"); Devel-
opments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1475-76 (1985)
(noting that the absence of the privilege may deter candid communication between
lawyers and clients).
24 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 73 (defining the
privilege for an organizational client).
25 Initial cases considering questions of privilege in the corporate context simply
assumed that the privilege was available and focused on its application. See, e.g.,
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 332-38 (1914); Grant v.
United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913) (applying privilege doctrine without question-
ing the existence of the corporate privilege). Fifty years later, an Illinois district court
found no precedent explicitly holding that the privilege applied to corporations and
therefore held that it did not. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp.
321, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). The Seventh Circuit
reversed, citing a large body of precedent implicitly recognizing the corporate privi-
lege and a strong reliance interest in its continuing recognition. See Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318-21 (7th Cir. 1963); see also JOHN WILLIAM
GERGAcz, ATro.N-C'oRPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE §§ 1.16-.18 (2003) (explaining the
history of the corporate privilege).
26 See, e.g., Rice, supra note 13, at 739-42; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying
Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
157, 158 (1993) (questioning the justifications for privilege in the corporate context).
27 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (rejecting the "control group" test for corporate
privilege as too narrow).
28 See Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 629, 633-45 (reviewing states' ap-
proaches to the corporate attorney-client privilege). There is no national law of privi-
lege and no codification in federal courts. Thus, the scope of the attorney-client
privilege is defined by federal and state common law. See GERGACZ, supra note 25,
§ 3.05; Glynn, supra note 22, at 59 (arguing that "the attorney client privilege is a
mess" and calling for federal codification).
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rations, unlike most individuals, "constantly go to lawyers to find out
how to obey the law," particularly since compliance with the law in
this area is hardly an instinctive matter.
29
In principle, the location of the lawyer does not affect the scope
of the privilege; the privilege applies to communication with inside
and outside counsel alike.30 In practice, however, courts tend to apply
more scrutiny to communication with in-house counsel because in-
house counsel are viewed as more likely to mix business and legal ad-
vice.31 The concern is that corporations (and, by analogy, other orga-
nizations) will funnel otherwise unprotected information through in-
house counsel in order to create a "zone of silence" over ordinary
business affairs.3 2 Thus, courts have denied the protection of privi-
lege where the in-house lawyer was found to be acting as a business
adviser, 33 negotiator,3 4 or in some other nonlegal role.
3 5
29 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392 (citations omitted) (quoting Bryson P. Burnham, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901, 913 (1969)).
30 See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Burlington Indus. v.
Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 36 (D. Md. 1974); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950) (stating that there is no basis for distin-
guishing in-house counsel from outside counsel for privilege purposes); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. i (2000) (stating that "[t]he privi-
lege under this Section applies without distinction to lawyers who are inside legal
counsel or outside legal counsel for an organization"); GERGACZ, supra note 25, § 3.18
(summarizing the case law).
31 See, e.g., Ryall v. Appleton Elec. Co., 153 F.R.D. 660, 663 (D. Colo. 1994) (ques-
tioning "the fairly recent expansion of the privilege to encompass corporate in-house
counsel"); Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., No. 90 Civ. 6328 (SWK), 1991
WL 274328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1991) (calling for heightened scrutiny in the case
of in-house counsel); Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989);
Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705-06 (N.Y. 1989). There is no
empirical evidence that in-house counsel are more likely than outside counsel to mix
business and legal roles; in fact, the evidence suggests that outside counsel give busi-
ness advice just as frequently. See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 238-41 (1989). For a
summary of factors that courts consider in determining whether in-house counsel was
acting as a lawyer, see GERGACZ, supra note 25, §§ 3.21-.30.
32 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395; Rossi, 540 N.E.2d at 705; Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 279, 288 (1984); see also Amy Weiss, In-House Counsel Beware: Wearing the Business
Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 394-400 (1998) (re-
viewing cases applying increased scrutiny to communications with in-house counsel
based on the "zone of silence" concern).
33 See, e.g., General Foods Corp. v. Jay V. Zimmerman Co., No. 86 Civ. 2697
(KLB), 1988 WL 5371, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1988).
34 See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125
(RPP), 1996 WL 29392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (finding negotiation of environ-
mental provisions in a contract to be outside a lawyer's "traditional function"); see also
20051
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A. Cases Recognizing In-Firm Privilege
The first case to consider a claim of in-firm privilege was In re
Sunrise Securities Litigation,36 a current-client case. In In re Sunrise, a
law firm (Blank Rome) representing a failed savings and loan associa-
tion (Sunrise) was named as a defendant in claims against Sunrise by
its outside directors, former shareholders, and the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation.3 7 Upon a motion to compel discov-
ery of certain internal documents, Blank Rome claimed the attorney-
client privilege, on the grounds that the documents represented com-
munications between the firm and its in-house counsel.
38
The court initially rejected the possibility of in-firm privilege,
holding that "[o] nly communications from one person or entity, a cli-
ent, to another person or entity, an attorney, can be protected by the
attorney client privilege,"39 whereas the law firm and its in-house
counsel were "members of one and the same entity."40 The court em-
phasized that the law firm had not formally designated any lawyer as
in-house counsel, and "at least some of the attorneys purportedly seek-
ing advice as 'Blank Rome the client' were themselves consulted for
advice as 'Blank Rome the attorney."' 41 Thus, the court found "no
facts to support treating the communications in question as between
attorney and client.
'42
Blank Rome moved for reconsideration on the issue of in-firm
privilege, arguing that communications between a law firm and its in-
house counsel are analogous to communications between a corpora-
tion and its in-house counsel, which may be protected by the attorney-
client privilege.43 On reconsideration, the court agreed "that it is pos-
sible in some instances for a law firm, like other businesses or profes-
sional associations, to receive the benefits of privilege when seeking
Weiss, supra note 32, at 401-03 ("[W]hen in-house attorneys are not acting solely in a
professional legal capacity, their communications with clients will not be privileged,
even if they render legal advice during those communications.").
35 See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (denying
the privilege where the lawyer was acting as accountant); Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 86-CV-609, 1989 WL 48413, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 1989)
(denying the privilege where the lawyer was acting as claims manager).
36 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
37 Id. at 562-63.
38 Id. at 572.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 572 n.35.
42 Id. at 572.
43 Id. at 594-95.
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legal advice from in-house counsel," 44 thus becoming the first court to
recognize the possibility of in-firm privilege.
The court went on, however, to note that "a law firm's consulta-
tion with in-house counsel may cause problems of conflicting fiduciary
duties which seldom arise in corporations or other professional as-
sociations,' 45 and held that communication that "creates a conflict be-
tween the law firm's fiduciary duties to itself and its duties to the
client" is not privileged.46 Thus, In re Sunrise established a fiduciary
exception to in-firm privilege where the communication at issue con-
cerns a current client of the firm.
Following In re Sunrise, a series of cases upheld claims to in-firm
privilege outside of the current-client context. In a 1991 memoran-
dum opinion, Lama Holding Co. v. Shearman & Sterling,47 the magis-
trate stated that "it is undisputed that an attorney-client relationship
can exist within a law firm," citing In re Sunrise, and denied plaintiffs
motion to compel discovery of client files and time sheet entries. 48
Three years later, in another memorandum opinion, Hertzog, Calamari
& Gleason v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,49 the court held that "a
law partnership which elects to use a partner or associate as counsel of
record in a litigated matter" creates "the functional equivalent of a
corporate staff attorney," and that the privilege attaches "[s] o long as
the individual in question is acting only as an [in-house] attorney,"
rather than as a participant in the underlying events.
50
In United States v. Rowe,5 1 the Ninth Circuit extended the scope of
in-firm privilege to cover factfinding by associates assigned to an inter-
nal investigation. In Rowe, the firm's senior partner (Rowe) learned
of irregularities in a firm lawyer's handling of client funds and as-
signed two associates to look into the matter.52 Rowe also wrote to the
state bar asking it to "take appropriate action."53 A grand jury investi-
gating the lawyer later subpoenaed the associates to ask them about
their conversations with Rowe, but the firm claimed that the conversa-
tions were privileged.
54
44 Id. at 595.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 597.
47 No. 89 Civ. 3639 (KTD), 1991 WL 115052 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1991).
48 Id. at *4.
49 850 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
50 Id.
51 96 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996).
52 Id. at 1295.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1296.
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The districtjudge held that the law firm had not met the require-
ments for privilege because the associates never were told that they
were working as the firm's attorneys and they did not record their
hours or bill the firm for their time on the matter.55 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that the associates "were, effectively, in-house
counsel" because Rowe assigned them to perform services "on behalf
of the firm.,,56 The court held, further, that the factfinding in ques-
tion qualified as "professional legal services," citing Upjohn.57 As the
Upjohn Court observed, "the privilege exists to protect not only the
giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice."
5 8
Finally, in Nesse v. Pittman,5 9 the court held that the attorney-cli-
ent and work product 60 privileges protect in-firm communication in
anticipation of litigation, including communication from one partner
to another for the purpose of conveying firm counsel's findings in an
internal investigation. 61 In Nesse, a Chapter 11 trustee (Nesse) of a
former client of the firm (Blair) sued the firm (Shaw Pittman) over
the manner of its withdrawal from representation. 62 A central issue in
the lawsuit was the conduct of one Shaw Pittman partner (Webster),
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1297.
58 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981).
59 206 F.R.D. 325 (D.D.C. 2002); 202 F.R.D. 344 (D.D.C. 2001).
60 The work product privilege protects documents "prepared in anticipation of
litigation" from discovery by the opposing party except on a showing of substantial
need. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 499-505 (1947). The work product privi-
lege is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which provides, in perti-
nent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things . . .pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation .. .only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the material in the preparation of
the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to ob-
tain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the
court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). This Article does not specifically address the scope of in-firm
work product privilege. However, much of my analysis of the attorney-client privilege
applies to the work product privilege as well.
61 Nesse, 206 F.R.D. at 329.
62 Nesse, 202 F.R.D. at 346-48.
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whose status in the firm also was under review by the firm's manage-
ment committee. 63
The magistrate initially considered motions to compel discovery
of a variety of documents, including documents prepared by Shaw
Pittman's general counsel (Harvey) regarding a potential lawsuit by
Blair 64 and notes from management committee meetings about Web-
ster's role in the Blair matter and Webster's performance in general.
65
The magistrate held that the documents prepared by Harvey, which
discussed settlement and litigation strategy, were "near perfect opin-
ion work product" and therefore protected "absolutely" under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 66 As to the notes from the manage-
ment committee meetings, which summarized Harvey's findings about
Webster's role in the Blair matter, the magistrate held that the appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege depended on the primary pur-
pose of the meetings and ordered an evidentiary hearing to
determine that purpose. According to the magistrate:
If the primary purpose of the . . . meetings was to evaluate Blair's
potential claim, the attorney-client privilege attaches .... On the
other hand, if ... the meetings primarily concerned Webster's sta-
tus at the firm, then Harvey's assistance could not fairly be de-
scribed as legal.
67
Following the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate issued a second
opinion in which he held that most of the notes were protected by the
attorney-client privilege, 68 including notes from two meetings in
which Harvey was not present.69 The magistrate based this holding
not on the primary purpose of the meeting, as he had indicated would
control, but rather on the primary purpose of Webster's communica-
tions to Harvey in the first place, citing Upjohn.70 The magistrate
stated:
Having heard the testimony and having considered more compre-
hensively the significance of the Upjohn case, I refine my decision. I
must focus exclusively on the reason why the lawyer collects the in-
63 Nesse, 206 F.R.D. at 327.
64 Nesse, 202 F.R.D. at 350-51.
65 Id. at 357-58.
66 Id. at 350 (citing FED. R. Cw. P. 26(b) (3)).
67 Id. at 357-58.
68 Nesse, 206 F.R.D. at 331 (stating that "all but one set of... notes are within the
attorney-client privilege"). The one set of notes held not to be privileged were a part-
ner's notes recording Webster's direct communications to the management commit-
tee. Id. at 329.
69 Id. at 329.
70 Id. at 330.
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formation from the client in the first place, and disregard the moti-
vation behind the lawyer's subsequent communication thereof, so
long as the lawyer is speaking to persons with whom the lawyer has a
privilege.
7'
Based on this logic, the magistrate held that the attorney-client privi-
lege covered all communications from Webster to Harvey for the pur-
pose of evaluating Blair's claim, even when such communications
were relayed by others for the purpose of evaluating Webster's
performance.
7 2
B. The Scope of the Privilege in Regard to Nonclients
Taken together, the nonclient cases offer broad protection for in-
firm communication under the attorney-client privilege. The cases
protect not only direct communication with in-house counsel 73 and
lawyers acting as the functional equivalent of in-house counsel,7 4 but
also factfinding by junior attorneys75 and partner-to-partner commu-
nication conveying the results of internal factfinding.
76
The cases also provide some guidelines for firms seeking to pre-
serve the privilege while relying on in-house counsel. For instance,
the cases suggest that the role of firm counsel should be formally des-
ignated by the firm, so that it is clear that firm counsel is acting as the
"functional equivalent of a corporate staff attorney. '77 The desig-
nated firm counsel should act only as an attorney for the firm and
have no involvement in the underlying events (such as the representa-
tion that gave rise to the claim).78 To underscore this separation and
the firm's identity as the client, firm counsel should bill the firm for
time spent on in-house advising.
79
71 Id.
72 Id. at 329-30.
73 Id. at 328.
74 United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996); Hertzog, Calamari &
Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 850 F. Supp. 255, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
75 Rowe, 96 F.3d at 1296-97.
76 Nesse, 206 F.R.D. at 329-30.
77 Hertzog, 850 F. Supp. at 255; see also In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 572
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (criticizing the firm for failing to distinguish between the lawyers
acting as firm counsel and the lawyers acting as clients); Gillers, supra note 12, at 111
(identifying the precautions a law firm should take to preserve in-firm privilege).
78 Hertzog, 850 F. Supp. at 255; Gillers, supra note 12, at 111.
79 Rowe, 96 F.3d at 1296 (citing the district court's disapproval of the fact that the
junior attorneys assigned to an internal investigation did not "bill the firm or record
hours expended on the firm's behalf"); see also Gillers, supra note 12, at 111 (recom-
mending that the firm set up a separate billing number for in-house matters).
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Protection of the privilege under these guidelines encourages law
firms to invest in and formalize the role of firm counsel. The require-
ments for privilege are most easily satisfied when the lawyer who acts
as firm counsel does so on a permanent, full-time basis and maintains
no outside practice.80 In that circumstance, there can be no question
of opportunistic hat-switching by the firm (as seemed to be the case in
In re Sunrise) or the firm's identity as the client. Partners who act as
firm counsel on a part-time but ongoing basis and bill the firm directly
for that service 81 also make it easy for courts to define them as the
"functional equivalent of a corporate staff attorney,"82 especially if
their professional title reflects their in-house role.
Partners who step in as advisers on an ad hoc basis, however-or,
as in Rowe, who direct associates to dig around on a problem part-
ner-run the risk that the courts will worry about abuse of the privi-
lege. As the plaintiff argued in Rowe, courts should not reward a law
firm simply for being a law firm by finding an attorney-client relation-
ship whenever one lawyer talks to another about a potential problem
in the firm.83 Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
denial of privilege in Rowe, the district court's concerns in that case
should stand as a warning to firms. What counts as the "functional
equivalent" of corporate counsel may be a moving target, especially in
large law firms. As more large law firms invest in permanent, paid in-
house counsel, firms that do not may begin to have trouble claiming
the privilege for less formal arrangements.
II. THE CURRENT-CLIENT CASES
While courts have extended broad protection to in-firm privilege
in regard to nonclients, courts have refused to recognize in-firm privi-
lege for communication about a current client. In re Sunrise is the
leading case on the current-client issue. According to In re Sunrise, the
problem with asserting in-firm privilege for communication about a
current client is the potential conflict of interest between the firm's
representation of the client and the firm's "representation of itself."
The court repeated this characterization of the conflict numerous
80 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 573 (reporting that ten of the thirty-
two firms in the study had full-time in-house counsel); Levy, supra note 1 (reporting
that "[m]ore than a quarter of firms polled by Altman Weil" had full-time in-house
counsel).
81 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 573 (reporting that five of the thirty-
two firms in the study had part-time firm counsel who billed the firm directly for in-
house advising).
82 Hertzog, 850 F. Supp. at 255.
83 Rowe, 96 F.3d at 1297.
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times in its opinion. For example: "[W]hen a law firm seeks legal ad-
vice from its in house counsel, the law firm's representation of itself
(through in house counsel) might be directly adverse to, or materially
limit, the law firm's representation of another client, thus creating a
prohibited conflict of interest. '8 4 Blank Rome's conflict, if any, arose
from the firm's simultaneous representation of both itself and
Sunrise.8
5
To assess the implications of this conflict, the court turned to a
line of cases that establish a fiduciary exception to the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege in shareholder litigation. The seminal case in this
line was Garner v. Wolfinbarger,86 which involved a shareholder deriva-
tive action, but the court treats Garner in a footnote. 87 Instead, it re-
lies on Valente v. PepsiCo,88 an application of Garner, presumably
because it is from the same circuit as the In re Sunrise court.
Valente was a class action brought by the minority shareholders of
Wilson Sporting Goods following Wilson's merger with PepsiCo.8 9 At
issue were pre-merger communications between PepsiCo and Pep-
siCo's general counsel (DeLuca) about the tax consequences of vari-
ous merger alternatives. 90 PepsiCo, at the time of the merger, was the
majority shareholder of Wilson, and some PepsiCo officers, including
DeLuca, sat on Wilson's board.91 Because of PepsiCo's controlling in-
terest in Wilson, the Valente court held that PepsiCo and its officers
owed a fiduciary duty to Wilson's minority shareholders and could not
claim the privilege against them, citing Garner.92 The court also held
that DeLuca owed a fiduciary duty to Wilson as a member of Wilson's
board.93 Thus, when Wilson sought to discover a memorandum pre-
pared for PepsiCo by DeLuca, the court held that PepsiCo could not
claim the privilege because of DeLuca's conflicting fiduciary duties.
According to Valente,
[a]t the time... [the memorandum] was drafted, its author, Peter
DeLuca, sat as a member of the Board of Directors of Wilson. He
was, in addition, General Counsel to PepsiCo. In those positions,
84 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
85 Id. at 597 n.12.
86 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
87 In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 596 n.9 (calling Garner "the seminal case").
88 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975) (denying privilege in a conflict between majority
and minority shareholders).
89 Id. at 363.
90 Id. at 364.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 366-67.
93 Id. at 368.
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he owed separate fiduciary obligations to two separate entities and
their interests. He could not subordinate the fiduciary obligations
which he owed to Wilson and the minority shareholders... to those
of his client PepsiCo. The fact that Wilson may not have had an
attorney-client relationship with him is of no import. His knowl-
edge in one capacity cannot be separated from the other, nor can
his duties as a fiduciary be lessened or increased because of profes-
sional relationship. It is a common, universally recognized excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege, that where an attorney serves
two clients having common interests and each party communicates
to the attorney, the communications are not privileged in a subse-
quent controversy between the two.
9 4
As this passage makes clear, Valente focused on in-house counsel's
fiduciary duties rather than those of his client, PepsiCo. In re Sunrise
correctly summarized the holding of Valente as follows:
[T] he [ Valente] Court addressed the issue of how conflicting fiduci-
ary duties owed by the attorney affect a client's attorney client privi-
lege .... The Valente Court held that the conflicting fiduciary duties
owed by DeLuca to Wilson and PepsiCo prevented assertion of the
attorney client privilege against Wilson.
95
Yet in applying Valente, In re Sunrise shifted the focus to the law
firm's duties to its client, Sunrise, and ignored the role of the in-house
lawyer. According to In re Sunrise,
the reasoning of Valente would dictate that a law firm's communica-
tion with in house counsel is not protected by the attorney client
privilege if the communication implicates or creates a conflict be-
tween the law firm's fiduciary duties to itself and its duties to the
client seeking to discover the communication. Because I find that
the Valente Court's well-reasoned analysis accommodates the inter-
ests of both the fiduciary or attorney and the beneficiary or client, I
will adopt it as the controlling rule in this case. The attorney client
privilege therefore will protect only those otherwise privileged docu-
ments... which do not contain communications or legal advice in
which Blank Rome's representation of itself violated Rule 1.7 with
respect to a Blank Rome client seeking the document. As a result,
examination of individual documents will be necessary.
In short, determination of whether the documents in question are
protected by the attorney-client privilege requires application of two
tests. First, the document must meet the requirements [for privilege]
set forth in United Shoe. Second, the document must not contain com-
munications or legal advice in which Blank Rome's representation of
94 Id.
95 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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itself violated Rule 1.7 with respect to a Blank Rome client seeking the
document.
96
The court then turned all but three documents over to a special
master for review.
9 7
The preceding passage contains the court's entire analysis of the
current-client issue. The court begins with Valente, but ends with a test
that does not seem to depend on Valente at all, but rather on ordinary
conflict analysis.98 Moreover, the "test" that the court announces is
little more than a restatement of the original issue; that is, to what
extent does a law firm lose the protection of privilege when the com-
munication at issue concerned a current client of the firm?
Numerous cases have criticized Valente as an application of Gar-
ne, 99 and other writers have criticized Valente as the foundation for In
re Sunrise.100 Yet despite the problems with Valente and In re Sunrise, In
re Sunrise has become the touchstone for the current-client analysis.
After In re Sunrise was decided in 1989, the current-client issue lay
dormant until two cases decided in 2002. In the first, Bank Brussels
Lambert v. Credit Lyonnaise (Suisse), S.A., 101 the law firm (Rogers &
Wells) had represented the client (CLS) in the client's financing of
certain oil transactions and in subsequent litigation growing out those
transactions. During that litigation, CLS told Rogers & Wells that if
CLS were found liable in the litigation, Rogers & Wells would be liable
to CLS. This assertion prompted the head of Rogers & Wells's Clients
and Ethics Committee, 10 2 whom the court refers to as "in-house coun-
sel,"10 3 to conduct an internal review of the firm's representation of
96 Id. at 597-98 (footnotes omitted).
97 Id. at 598.
98 See id. at 597 n.12 (referring to Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Responsibil-
ity 1.7 on conflicts of interest).
99 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 722-23 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
("To the extent that Valente abandons the requirement that plaintiff-shareholders
demonstrate 'good cause,' we disagree with that court's reasoning."); Lee v. Engle,
Nos. Civ. A. 13323, Civ. A. 13284, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *7 n.2 (Del. Ch. Dec.
15, 1995) (criticizing Valente for establishing a per se fiduciary exception to the privi-
lege rather than requiring the plaintiffs to show "good cause" why the privilege
should not apply, as in Garner).
100 See Barker, supra note 14, at 471 (stating that "the many flaws in [ Valente's]
reasoning render it an infirm foundation for the Sunrise Securities rule"); Douglas
Richmond, Law Firm Internal Investigations: Principles and Perils, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69,
97-99 (2004) (criticizing Valente's application of the common interest exception to
the privilege and stating that "any decision in which a court relies on Valente is also
suspect").
101 220 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
102 Id. at 284.
103 Id. at 287.
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CLS, including a review of potential conflicts and the firm's potential
liability. 10 4 CLS later fired the firm and filed a lawsuit alleging mal-
practice, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.
0 5
In support of its malpractice action, CLS sought discovery of doc-
uments related to the internal review, claiming that such documents
were created in violation of Rogers & Wells's fiduciary duty to CLS.
10 6
Rogers & Wells claimed that the documents were privileged, citing
Rowe, Hertzog, and Lama, but the court held that they were not, citing
In re Sunrise and the New York disciplinary rule governing conflicts of
interest. 10 7 According to the court,
[w] hen R & W performed the conflict check, CLS was still its client.
Therefore, R & W was under an ethical duty to disclose to CLS the
results of its internal conflict check, and in no position to claim a
privilege against their client. While the privilege will be applicable
against all the world, it cannot be maintained against CLS.
R & W has taken the untenable position that "the advice
[sought in performing its conflict check] was not sought for the
benefit of CLS." However, the purpose of the conflict review ... is
to maintain the fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality owed
to the client .... It would seem inadvisable to expect in-house coun-
sel to be shielded from a client's inquiries by attorney-client privi-
lege in performing a conflict check when it is common knowledge
that a conflict as to one attorney at a firm is a conflict as to all ....
... Therefore, this Court finds that a law firm cannot invoke
the attorney-client privilege against a current client when perform-
ing a conflict check in furtherance of representing that client.
10 8
Although the court rested its holding on the current client issue,
the court also signaled its skepticism of in-firm privilege more gener-
ally. According to Bank Brussels, in-house counsel are not as indepen-
dent as outside counsel and are more likely to mix business and legal
functions. 10 9 Further, "[o] nly recently.., have courts begun to strug-
gle with the question of the attorney-client privilege being applied to
in-house counsel communications within a law firm." 1 0 Thus, accord-
ing to the court in Bank Brussels, in-firm privilege is not as robust as
Rowe et al. might suggest:
104 Id. at 284.
105 Id. at 284-85.
106 Id. at 285.
107 Id. at 287 (citing N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1999)).
108 Id. at 287-88 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
109 Id. at 286.
110 Id.
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In raising the attorney-client privilege to protect its conflict check, R
& W assumes that the privilege will automatically apply to in-house
legal consultation. However, this assumption glosses over the gen-
eral reluctance and narrow, grudging application of the privilege in
these cases. The novel idea which R & W puts fourth [sic] first ap-
peared in In re Sunrise Securities Litigation. In Sunrise, the Court ini-
tially refused to recognize the privilege . . . . However, on
reconsideration, the Court... noted "that it is possible in some in-
stances for the privilege to apply.1 1'
The second current-client case decided in 2002 was Koen Book Dis-
tributors v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carre, Bowman & Lombardo,
P.Co112 In Koen Book, the client (Koen Book) had retained the law
firm (Powell, Trachtman) for advice concerning a security interest of
one of its customers, which later filed for bankruptcy. Powell,
Trachtman continued to represent Koen Book as creditors in the
bankruptcy proceeding, but Koen Book became dissatisfied with the
firm's services and informed the firm that it was considering a mal-
practice action against it. During this period, Koen Book engaged
other outside counsel, whom they consulted regarding the quality of
Powell, Trachtman's services, 113 but also continued to retain Powell,
Trachtman until shortly after a previously scheduled bankruptcy
hearing.
114
After Koen Book threatened malpractice, but before it fired Pow-
ell, Trachtman, the Powell, Trachtman lawyers who were working on
the Koen Book matter consulted with "another lawyer in the firm con-
cerning ethical and legal issues that had arisen out of the portent of a
malpractice action." 1 5 Koen Book sought discovery of the documents
related to this consultation. The firm claimed that the documents
were protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges, but
the court held that they were not, citing In re Sunrise, Valente, and the
Pennsylvania rule on concurrent conflicts of interest."
6
Unlike the court in Bank Brussels, the court in Koen Book was sym-
pathetic to the law firm's claim. The court stated that "[i] t is clear
that the attorney-client privilege applies in the corporate setting when
an employee seeks legal advice from in-house counsel,"1 17 and that
111 Id. at 286-87 (citations omitted).
112 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
113 Id. at 283-84.
114 Id. at 286.
115 Id. at 284. The opinion does not indicate the status or title of the lawyer
consulted.
116 Id. at 285 (citing PA. RuLEs or PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004)).
117 Id. at 284.
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the documents "clearly would have been protected from discovery...
if a third party... had sought access to them."'1 18 However, the court
held that "it is the relationship between the clients and the law firm
from which discovery is sought that is central to the analysis."1 19 The
court noted that, once the client threatened to sue, the firm could
have tried to withdraw or sought the client's consent for its in-firm
consultation, but the firm did neither. 120 Thus, as long as the firm
continued to represent the client, the court held that the firm could
not maintain any privilege against the client.
We recognize that the firm was enmeshed in an unenviable situa-
tion once the [malpractice] threat had been made with a hearing
before the bankruptcyjudge... only two weeks away. Nonetheless,
the firm still owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs while they remained
clients. This duty is paramount to its own interests.
12'
Koen Book is the clearest analysis of the current-client issue. Al-
though the court politely cites In re Sunrise and Valente, acknowledging
the judge in In re Sunrise as a colleague1 22 and calling Valente "the
seminal case in this circuit,"123 the court focuses mainly on the test
from In re Sunrise, which points to the state conflict rule, and raises the
issues of withdrawal and waiver, which are relevant to the application
of that rule.
Further, unlike In re Sunrise, Koen Book does not conflate the du-
ties of the law firm and its in-house counsel-perhaps because Koen
Book does not address the duties of in-house counsel at all. Neverthe-
less, as I argue below, Koen Book reaches the wrong result on the issue
of in-firm privilege.
A. Critique
There are three problems with the courts' analysis in the current-
client cases. First, the courts fail to distinguish between two potential
sources of conflict: the firm's duty to the client and in-house counsel's
duty to the firm. This problem is most pronounced in In re Sunrise, in
its characterization of the conflict and its application of Valente, but
the problem haunts Bank Brussels as well.




122 Id. at 284 (stating "[m]y colleague Judge Thomas O'Neill faced a like issue a
number of years ago in In re Sunrise Securities Litigation").
123 Id. at 285.
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This leads to the second problem, again most pronounced in In
re Sunrise, which is that the courts misapply Garner, via Valente, in their
analysis of the firm's duty to the client. This problem stems in part
from the infirmities in Valente, but also from the courts' confusion
about which fiduciary relationship is at issue.
Finally, why apply Garner at all? The legal profession has its own
rules governing lawyers' fiduciary duties and the avoidance of conflicts
of interest; why reach out to apply a doctrine developed in the context
of shareholder litigation? The Garner doctrine is controversial even in
its original context, and a number of jurisdictions have declined to
adopt it.124 The extension of Garner to other types of fiduciary rela-
tionships also is controversial, 125 even without any intrusion on com-
peting professional rules. In any event, the invocation of Garner via
Valente does little to advance the analysis in In re Sunrise or the cases
that follow. In the end, all three cases return to the profession's own
rules governing conflicts of interest.
The following sections elaborate on these problems and propose
an alternative approach. I propose that the scope of the privilege in
regard to current clients be governed by the rules of professional con-
duct and traditional privilege analysis, including the traditional excep-
tions (such as the crime-fraud exception and waiver). I argue that this
approach strikes the appropriate balance between the interests of
firms and clients and advances the public interest in law firm self-
regulation.
B. The Law Firm's Duty to the Client
In re Sunrise characterizes the conflict at issue as a conflict be-
tween the firm's representation of the client and the firm's "represen-
124 See Milroy v. Hanson, 875 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D. Neb. 1995) (criticizing Garner
as inconsistent with Upjohn); Lefkowitz v. Duquesne Light Co., CIV. A. Nos. 86-1046,
86-2085, 1988 WL 169273, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 1988) (quoting Shirvani v. Captial
Investing Corp., 112 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1986), for the court's rejection of Garner on
the basis that it ignores the "genuine need of management in the ordinary course of
confidential communication and advice"); Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112
F.R.D. 389, 390-91 (D. Conn. 1986) (criticizing Garnerfor ignoring the needs of man-
agement for confidential advice); Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Superior Court
of Santa Clara County, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 897 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating that Califor-
nia courts have refused to recognize a shareholder exception to the statutory corpo-
rate privilege); Agster v. Barmada, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 363 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1999)
(stating that Garner is inconsistent with Pennsylvania case law on the corporate
privilege).
125 See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder
Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1984) (criticiz-
ing Garner and its extension).
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tation of itself."1 26 This phrase conflates two separate issues: whether
the firm can defend at all against a claim by a current client (the "rep-
resentation" piece) and whether the firm can use in-house counsel to
do so (the "itself' piece).
Although its phrasing is confusing, the court in In re Sunrise
seems to object primarily to the use of in-house counsel. For instance,
the court states in a footnote
Blank Rome's conflict, if any, arose from the firm's simultaneous
representation of both itself and Sunrise .... If, for example, the
documents sought were communications by Blank Rome to its own
outside counsel, Rule 1.7 would not apply since Blank Rome would
be represented by outside counsel, not by Blank Rome itself.
12 7
Yet the court goes on to apply Garner, which does not distinguish
between inside and outside counsel. 128 Garner involved the right of
shareholders to gain access to otherwise privileged communication in
a derivative action. 129 Under Garner, the privilege may be withheld
from any attorney-client communication that "occurred prior to the
assertion of charges and relates directly to those charges."1 30 Thus, if
Garner is to govern the scope of in-firm privilege, law firms will risk
losing the privilege for any communication about the representation
of a current client, including communication with outside counsel,
when the communication occurs prior to the assertion of charges and
relates directly to those charges. Such a rule would make the privilege
uncertain whenever a law firm made the effort to sort out its duties to
a client prospectively to prevent a problem from arising. How per-
verse an incentive is that?
To make matters worse, the current-client cases misapply Garner
in two important respects, such that the denial of privilege is even
broader than Garner would demand. First, the cases rely on Valente,
and Valente gets Garner wrong. Garner established a balancing test to
determine the application of privilege1 31 and placed the burden of
proof on the party seeking discovery to show "good cause" why the
privilege should be denied.13 2 According to Garner,
126 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
127 Id. at 597 n.12.
128 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 n.18 (5th Cir. 1970) ("We do not
consider it determinative whether the attorney consulted is corporated [sic] or house
counsel.").
129 Id. at 1095-96.
130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwwRs § 85(b) (2000) (sum-
marizing the Garner doctrine).
131 Garner, 430 F.2d at 1103.
132 Id. at 1104 (identifying nine factors that courts should consider in determining
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[t]he corporation is not barred from asserting [the privilege]
merely because those demanding information enjoy the status of
stockholders. But where the corporation is in suit against its stock-
holders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, pro-
tection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of
the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to
the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be
invoked in the particular instance.
183
Valente, however, shifts the burden to the party claiming the privilege,
creating a rule of presumptive disclosure.13 4 According to Valente,
Garner... stand [s] generally for the proposition that where a corpo-
ration seeks advice from legal counsel, and the information relates
to the subject of a later suit by a minority shareholder in the corpo-
ration, the corporation is not entitled to claim the privilege as
against its own shareholder, absent some special cause.
13 5
Secondly, both Bank Brussels and Koen Book ignore the distinction
in Garner between communication that occurs prior to the assertion of
charges and communication that occurs in response to the charges.1 36
The fiduciary exception in Garner is based on the existence of a com-
mon interest between corporate managers and shareholders.13 7 Once
shareholders bring an action against management, this common in-
terest disappears. Thus, the fiduciary exception to the privilege does
not apply once a claim is asserted.1 3
8
In Bank Brussels and Koen Book, the communication at issue was
prompted by an assertion of wrongdoing by the client and made for
the purpose of assessing the client's claims. Such communication is
outside the scope of the Garner doctrine, properly applied.
the presence or absence of good cause).
133 Id. at 1103-04.
134 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (criticiz-
ing Valente for abandoning the good cause requirement); Lee v. Engle, Nos. Civ. A.
13323, Civ. A. 13284, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 149, at *6 n.1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 1995)
(stating that Garner and Valente are "facially at odds," and that the court would follow
Garner rather than Valente); see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
135 Valente v. PepsiCo, 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975).
136 See Barker, supa note 14, at 470 (criticizing Bank Brussels and Koen Book on this
point).
137 Garner, 430 F.2d at 1103 (discussing the common interest exception to the
privilege as a useful analogy for the relationship between shareholders and
management).
138 id. at 1104 (identifying the factors to be considered in determining whether
the fiduciary exception applies); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERs § 85 cmt. c & reporter's note (2000) (explaining that the Garner doctrine covers
communications that were "contemporaneous with the acts being challenged" rather
than communications that occur during the corporation's defense of the claim).
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As a result of these two misapplications of Garner, the current-
client cases create a presumptive denial of in-firm privilege both
before and after a charge is asserted. Under this approach, there is no
in-firm privilege for communication about a current client, even if the
client is suing the firm. In fact, there is no privilege at all for law firms
that seek advice about an ongoing representation, whether from in-
side or outside counsel.' 39 Instead, a firm that wants privileged advice
must first withdraw from the representation. 140 And if withdrawal is
not possible-for instance, because of pending litigation 41-the firm
must simply forgo privileged advice altogether.
142
This approach is inconsistent with Upjohn, which emphasizes the
role of in-house counsel in promoting organizational compliance with
law.143 It also is inconsistent with the profession's own rules governing
lawyers' fiduciary duties to clients. While it is true that lawyers owe
"fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality . . . to the client,"
144
these duties are not always "paramount to [lawyers'] own interest,"
145
or to lawyers' duty to comply with the rules of professional conduct.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain an explicit excep-
tion to the duty of confidentiality, for instance, to the extent that the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary "to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client."1 46 Lawyers also may reveal client confidences to the extent
necessary "to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with
these Rules.
1 47
139 The In re Sunrise court acknowledges this logic, but declines to make it part of
the holding, stating: "Since the question is not before me, I express no opinion as to
whether Garner and its progeny would require a law firm to disclose to a client com-
munications between the law firm and its outside counsel relating to the law firm's
representation of that client." In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 n.12 (E.D.
Pa. 1989).
140 Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrie, Bowman &
Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
141 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2003) (requiring lawyers to
"comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when
terminating a representation"); id. R. 1.16(d) (requiring the lawyer to give "reasona-
ble notice" to the client and "time for employment of other counsel" before withdraw-
ing); see also Barker, supra note 14, at 470 (noting that the firm in Koen Book "probably
could not have withdrawn until the completion of the bankruptcy hearing").
142 See Koen Book, 212 F.R.D. at 286 (calling the firm's position "unenviable").
143 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 388, 392 (1981).
144 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283,
287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
145 Koen Book, 212 F.R.D. at 286.
146 MODEL RULES OF PROESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (5).
147 Id. R. 1.6(b)(4).
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The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers also ex-
plicitly protects lawyers' interests in assessing their duties to clients
and protecting such assessments from disclosure to the client. For
instance, the rule governing documents relating to a representation
provides that "a lawyer must allow a client or former client to inspect
and copy any document possessed by the lawyer relating to the repre-
sentation.' ' 48 However, the comment to this rule provides
[a] lawyer may refuse to disclose to the client certain law-firm
documents reasonably intended only for internal review, such as a
memorandum discussing.., the firm's possible malpractice liability
to the client. The need for lawyers to be able to set down their
thoughts privately in order to assure effective and appropriate rep-
resentation warrants keeping such documents secret from the client
involved.
1 49
As this comment makes clear, a presumptive denial of privilege in
regard to current clients is unjustified. A law firm, like any fiduciary,
maintains the right to seek legal advice regarding its duties to clients,
and there is nothing about the firm's duty to the client per se that
prevents the privilege from attaching. There may be limits on the
scope of the privilege, for instance stemming from ambiguities in the
in-house lawyer's role or from the law firm's effort to perpetuate a
crime or fraud, but these limits are properly defined by way of tradi-
tional privilege analysis, not simply by pointing to the law firm's status
as fiduciary. As a critic of Garner writes,
[t]he word "fiduciary" has no talismanic quality that dictates abdica-
tion of the usual approach to attorney-client privilege whenever the
word is invoked. Those who have fiduciary responsibility often want
legal advice concerning their responsibilities. They should have the
same opportunity to consult with counsel and to speak freely and
without fear of making admissions as any other clients.
150
C. In-House Counsel's Duty to the Firm
Having disposed of the current-client issue based on the law
firm's duty to the client, In re Sunrise et al. say relatively little about in-
house counsel's duty to the firm. If the firm cannot claim the privi-
lege at all, the duties of in-house counsel do not matter. In fact, how-
ever, as noted above, In re Sunrise and Bank Brussels turn primarily on
concerns about the role of firm in-house counsel.
148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46(2) (2000).
149 Id. § 46 cmt. c.
150 Saltzburg, supra note 125, at 846.
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This section argues that the role of firm counsel is the proper
focus of analysis in evaluating in-firm privilege claims. Assuming that
law firms have some right to privileged legal advice about their duties
to current clients, the question is whether (if ever) a law firm may
obtain such advice from firm in-house counsel. The answer, I argue,
depends on whether there is a conflict of interest between firm coun-
sel's duty to the law firm and firm counsel's duty to the outside client.
Whether firm counsel has a conflict of interest is, in part, a fac-
tual question. In some circumstances, there is an obvious conflict. In
In re Sunrise, for instance, the law firm had not designated any one
lawyer as firm in-house counsel, and some of the lawyers who coun-
seled the firm were involved in the representation at issue. 151 Clearly,
the same lawyer who represents the outside client cannot simultane-
ously represent the firm in a dispute between the firm and that client
without the informed consent of both clients. 15 2 If the outside client
is suing the firm, the same lawyer cannot represent both clients even
with the clients' consent.
15 3
The question becomes more difficult, however, when the firm ob-
serves the guidelines established in Rowe, Hertzog, and Nesse, such that
firm counsel's only conflict of interest is that imputed to all members
of the firm. 154 For instance, what if the firm employs full-time firm
counsel, such that firm counsel has no involvement in the representa-
tion of outside clients and does not profit directly from any one cli-
ent's fees?
The question also becomes more difficult when the outside client
alleges wrongdoing and threatens to bring a claim against the firm,
but nevertheless expects the firm to continue the representation (as
in both Bank Brussels and Koen Book). Under these circumstances, may
the firm obtain privileged advice from firm counsel without the ex-
press consent of the outside client?
The current-client cases say no. According to the logic of In re
Sunrise et al., a conflict of interest must be imputed to firm in-house
151 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 572 n.35 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
152 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (stating "a lawyer shall not
represent a client if ... the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client").
153 See id. R. 1.7(b)(3) (stating that, notwithstanding the existence of a conflict
under Rule 1.7(a), a client may consent to the representation if "the representation
does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client repre-
sented by the lawyer in the same litigation").
154 See id. R. 1.10(a) (stating "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of
them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would
be prohibited from doing so").
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counsel regardless of the structure of the in-house position or the
facts of the representation at issue. As the court states in Bank Brus-
sels, "it is common knowledge that a conflict as to one attorney at a
firm is a conflict as to all."15 5 Moreover, under Koen Book, the client's
desire to continue the representation despite allegations of wrongdo-
ing does not count as a waiver of the imputed conflict.15 6 Thus, in
order to enjoy the protection of privilege, the firm must obtain the
outside client's express consent to the firm's use of in-house counsel.
This approach is consistent with the American Bar Association
(ABA) position on the imputation of conflicts of interest, 157 which
permits nonconsensual screening only in the case of former govern-
ment lawyers. I5 8 Though an increasing number ofjurisdictions take a
more flexible approach, for instance by permitting nonconsensual
screening of private lawyers who move between firms ("lateral screen-
ing"), 159 or by limiting lawyers' duty to withdraw in the case of "thrust
155 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283,
288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
156 Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman &
Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (suggesting that the firm should
have sought the client's express consent to the firm's in-house consultation).
157 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (Imputation of Conflicts of Inter-
est: General Rule).
158 See id. R. 1.11(b) (providing that conflicts of interest stemming from former
government employment are not imputed to other lawyers in the firm provided that
the former government lawyer "is timely screened from any participation in the mat-
ter and is apportioned no portion of the fee" and that "written notice is promptly
given to the appropriate government agency").
159 As of Fall 2004, sixteen states allow some form of lateral screening (Arizona,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, NewJersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington). SeeARiz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(d) (2004); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2004); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2), (e) (2004);
IND. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2004); Ky. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.10(d) (1999); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2004); MASS. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(d)(2) (2004); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)
(2005); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(2) (2005); MONT. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)(1) (2004); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2)
(2004); N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (1) (2004); OR. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2005); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(1)
(2004); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)(3) (2004); WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(1) (2004). Some other states, as well as an increasing
number of federal courts, allow lateral screening by court decision. See, e.g., In re
County of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that while "the
lawyer himself is automatically disqualified, his law firm may serve as counsel, so long
as an ethical wall has been erected to bar the disqualified lawyer from any participa-
tion in the case"); Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994) (em-
ploying a three-part analysis to determine if the attorney should be disqualified and
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upon" conflicts, 160 the ABA has rejected proposals to limit the imputa-
tion of conflicts, including, most recently, a proposal to allow lateral
screening under Rule 1.10.161
Nevertheless, as applied to firm counsel, the automatic imputa-
tion of conflicts serves no one's interest. From the firm's perspective,
its main effect is to increase the cost of privileged advice by requiring
the firm to retain outside counsel or withdraw from the representa-
tion at issue. As a practical matter, the chief consequence of this ap-
proach will be to discourage firms from seeking early advice when
problems with clients arise1 62 or at least to make sure that in-firm com-
munication is not conducted in writing or by e-mail.
1 63
Requiring the firm to obtain outside counsel or withdraw from
the representation also does not serve the interests of the outside cli-
ent. Certainly, the client is no better off if the firm retains outside
counsel. 164 And the client's interests may be seriously harmed by en-
couraging the firm to withdraw at the first hint of a problem because
withdrawal limits the firm's opportunity (and incentive?) to mitigate
harm to the client.1 65 Finally, the traditional arguments for imputing
conflicts are unpersuasive when the firm itself is the potentially ad-
verse client. The primary reasons for imputation are to "[give] effect
to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who
recognizing a rebuttable presumption); Richard B. v. State, 71 P.3d 811, 820-21
(Alaska 2003) (noting that the knowledge of a conflict is not automatically imputed to
every lawyer within the firm); Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258,
267-68 (Ohio 1998) (adopting a rebuttable-presumption test as to whether disqualifi-
cation should occur).
160 See D.C. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(d) (limiting the lawyer's duty to
withdraw from representing directly adverse interests when "a conflict not reasonably
foreseeable at the outset of representation arises . . . after the representation
commences").
161 The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended that Rule 1.10 be amended to
permit lateral screening, but the ABA House of Delegates rejected the proposal in
August 2001 by a 176 to 130 vote. See Robert A. Creamer, Three Myths About Lateral
Screening, 13 THE PROF'L LAw. 20 (2002) (summarizing the debate about lateral
screening and criticizing the ABA's approach). Nevertheless, a number of states have
adopted the Ethics 2000 Commission proposal into their state rules of professional
conduct. See supra note 159.
162 See Barker, supra note 14, at 471.
163 As one firm counsel from the focus groups queried: "'Somebody comes in and
reports to you: do you document or do you not? I mean, do you use e-mail? I hate e-
mail. I don't want anything on the system .... [A13]." Chambliss & Wilkins, supra
note 1, at 590-91.
164 See Barker, supra note 14, at 471.
165 See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Responsibility: Multijurisdictional Practice, Inter-
nal Discussions, Counsel's Advice, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 2003, at 3 (criticizing Koen Book).
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practice in a law firm" 166 and to prevent the misuse of confidential
information by lawyers in the same firm. According to the Restate-
ment, "[1] awyers affiliated [in the same law firm] .. .ordinarily have
access to files and other confidential information about each other's
clients .... Sharing confidential client information among affiliated
lawyers might compromise the representation of one or both clients if
the representations conflict.
167
These arguments make little sense, however, when the firm itself
is seeking advice about a potential dispute with a client. As noted
above, the firm's duty of loyalty to the client does not prevent the firm
from attempting to defend against client claims. This effort to defend
is no more "disloyal" when it involves inside rather than outside coun-
sel. Further, the right to defend includes t e right to reveal client
confidences when necessary "to secure legal advice about the lawyer's
compliance with these Rules" 168 or "to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the cli-
ent."169 Thus, the imputation of conflicts to firm in-house counsel
adds nothing to the protection of the outside client's interests in loy-
alty or confidentiality. Instead, its primary effect is to discourage law
firms from using in-house counsel.
D. A Suggested Approach to In-Firm Privilege
Rather than simply denying the privilege for in-firm advice about
current clients, the scope of the privilege vis-A-vis current clients
should turn on the facts of the representation at issue. Where firm
counsel individually has no conflict of interest under Rule 1.7170 or
Rule 1.9,171 and the in-firm communication meets the ordinary re-
quirements for privilege, courts should not automatically impute a
conflict under Rule 1.10. Instead, the imputation of conflicts should
depend on the structure of the in-house position.
Where firm counsel holds a full-time position and does not re-
present outside clients, courts should not impute a conflict under
Rule 1.10. This exception to imputation is justified by the structural
segregation of the in-house position and the formal designation of the
firm as firm counsel's only client.
166 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.10 cmt. 2 (2003).
167 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123 cmt. b (2000).
168 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4).
169 Id. R. 1.6(b)(5).
170 See id. R. 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients).
171 See id. R. 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients).
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Courts also should not impute a conflict to part-time firm counsel
where the lawyer who serves in that capacity does so on a formal,
ongoing basis, such that the firm is clearly established as the client
before the in-firm communication occurs. While firm counsel's
outside practice may lead to individual conflicts of interest-for in-
stance, where firm counsel has formerly represented the current cli-
ent seeking discovery-the maintenance of an outside practice, per
se, presents no additional argument in favor of imputation. As long as
firm counsel has no involvement in the outside representation at issue
and the firm is clearly established as the client before the in-firm com-
munication occurs, firm counsel should be treated as the functional
equivalent of corporate in-house counsel.
Lawyers who act as firm counsel on a one-shot or ad hoc basis
should be subject to imputation unless the firm can show that an at-
torney-client relationship was established before the in-firm communi-
cation occurred. In other words, in the absence of a formal "firm
counsel" position-or where firm counsel delegates matters to other
lawyers in the firm 1 72-the burden should shift to the law firm to
show that the identity and role of "firm counsel" was clearly defined.
Compensation is the clearest way to demarcate the role of firm
counsel. As Rowe suggests, 173 formal billing procedures help to estab-
lish the firm as the client and to distinguish the lawyer who acts as
firm counsel from other lawyers in the firm. Thus, a lawyer who acts
as firm counsel on an ad hoc basis should bill the firm for time spent
on in-house matters, or at least create a separate billing number in
order to record the time spent.1 74 A firm-wide announcement that a
particular lawyer or lawyers will be representing the firm also could
help to establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship. In
the absence of such formalities, however, a lawyer who acts as firm
counsel on an ad hoc basis should be subject to imputation under
Rule 1.10.
This structural approach is designed to encourage firms to for-
malize the role of firm counsel and to compensate lawyers directly for
their in-house service to the firm. As I explain in Part III, such formal
investment has important cultural benefits within firms, while provid-
ing a benchmark for the recognition of in-firm privilege.
172 In some firms, firm counsel acts primarily as a point person, who delegates
questions and problems to specialists in the firm. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note
1, at 575 (providing examples).
173 United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996).
174 See Gillers, supra note 12, at 111 (recommending that the firm set up a sepa-
rate billing number for in-house matters).
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A structural approach also helps to insure that both the firm and
firm counsel take seriously the responsibilities of the firm counsel
role. If the firm is the client, firm counsel's responsibilities are de-
fined in part by Rule 1.13,175 which creates a host of specialized ethi-
cal and regulatory duties for lawyers. These duties should not be
taken lightly by law firm in-house counsel or ignored by lawyers who
act as firm counsel on an ad hoc basis. My approach encourages law
firms to clearly define the role of firm counsel and encourages firm
counsel to clearly define the firm as the client.
My approach eliminates the need to distinguish between commu-
nication that occurs prior to, versus in response to, a claim by the
client.176 This distinction would be relevant only to an analysis of
waiver where firm counsel has a conflict of interest individually or by
imputation. For instance, if a lawyer acts as firm counsel on an ad hoc
basis and does not qualify for an exception to the ordinary imputation
of conflicts, but the communication at issue occurred in response to
an assertion of wrongdoing by the client, then the client's willingness
to continue the representation might be viewed as a waiver of the im-
puted conflict. Where the firm discovers potential wrongdoing and
promptly notifies the client, there also may be an argument for waiver
if the client elects to continue the representation. Where the firm
discovers potential wrongdoing and has not yet notified the client,
however, there is no argument for waiver, since the client has not
been informed of firm counsel's potential conflict.
My approach supports the denial of privilege in both In re Sunrise
and Bank Brussels, but oh different grounds than the courts articulated
in those cases. In In re Sunrise, as noted above, firm in-house counsel
had an obvious conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 because the lawyers
who acted as so-called firm counsel were mostly the same lawyers who
represented the outside client. 177 Thus, my approach would deny the
privilege on straight conflict of interest grounds (without the invoca-
tion of the Garner doctrine).
In Bank Brussels, there were two problems with the firm's claim to
privilege. First, the lawyer who served as firm counsel (Cirillo) was the
head of the firm's Clients and Ethics Committee (read: conflicts com-
mittee) and probably was not formally designated or compensated as
in-house counsel. 178 Under my approach, Cirillo therefore would be
175 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (Organization as Client).
176 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
178 Lawyers who provide in-house advising as part of committee service to the firm
typically are not compensated directly for their in-house service. See Chambliss &
Wilkins, supra note 1, at 572.
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subject to the imputation of conflicts under Rule 1.10. And though
the communication at issue-a conflicts check-occurred in response
to an allegation of wrongdoing by the client, the firm appears to have
hidden the results of the conflicts check from the client for almost two
years.1 79 A law firm has an ethical duty to "promptly inform the client
of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's in-
formed consent.., is required," 180 including any conflict of interest.
Since there was not adequate notice to the client of the firm's poten-
tially adverse interests, the firm has no argument for waiver of firm
counsel's imputed conflict.
The second problem with the firm's claim to in-firm privilege in
Bank Brussels is that the firm appears to have had an actual conflict of
interest with the client and to have sought Cirillo's advice primarily in
order to conceal the conflict.181 If that is the case, the communica-
tion at issue does not meet the ordinary requirements for privilege.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply when a client uses the
lawyer's advice "to engage in or assist a crime or fraud."182 Though
one might argue that concealing a professional conflict of interest
does not amount to the type of fraud required by the crime-fraud ex-
ception, the Restatement states that, for the purpose of the exception,
"[f] raud . . . requires a knowing or reckless misrepresentation (or
nondisclosure when applicable law requires disclosure) likely to injure
another."183 This definition would seem to cover the knowing nondis-
closure of a conflict under the rules of professional conduct.
84
My approach does not support the denial of privilege in Koen
Book unless the lawyer who served as firm counsel had an individual
conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 (a fact that is not pro-
vided in the opinion). 185 In Koen Book, the client threatened to sue
the firm for malpractice, but continued to use the firm for five weeks
179 Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283,
284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (suggesting that the law firm concealed its own malpractice
from the client, including the extent and significance of its conflicting interests).
180 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.4(a)(1).
181 Bank Brussels, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 82(b) (2000).
183 Id. § 82 cmt. d.
184 See Richmond, supra note 100, at 103-04 (arguing that the crime-fraud excep-
tion should not defeat claims to in-firm privilege where the communication concerns
.ongoing or future conduct that might be characterized as merely negligent or as
amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty, rather than as fraudulent or criminal," but
noting that the exception "might apply where a law firm consults with counsel to
'cover up' malpractice or other wrongdoing").
185 The opinion states only that the lawyers representing the outside client con-
sulted with "another lawyer in the firm concerning ethical and legal issues." Koen
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until the conclusion of a pending bankruptcy hearing. During that
period, the client retained separate counsel to build its malpractice
case against the firm.
186
The court held that in order to claim the privilege for its own
defense preparations, the firm should have tried to withdraw or to
seek the client's express consent to its in-firm consultation, 187 but
these are not realistic options. The firm probably could not have with-
drawn given the impending hearing, and the client had no incentive
to consent to a claim of in-firm privilege by the firm. 188
Instead, the court should have protected the firm's claim to in-
firm privilege on policy grounds. The policies favoring the firm's
right to confer with counsel in this context-that is, during a five-week
period of open dispute where the client was represented by separate
counsel and the firm was not free to withdraw-are stronger than the
policies requiring the imputation of conflicts. Thus, even if firm
counsel did not qualify for an exception to imputation based on the
criteria outlined above, under the facts of Koen Book, the client should
be held to have waived any imputed conflict.
One might protest that there is no need to find a constructive
waiver since, after all, the firm was free to seek privileged advice from
outside counsel. However, the firm's freedom to hire outside counsel
only strengthens my argument. Assuming that inside counsel had no
individual conflict of interest, the only difference between outside
counsel and inside counsel is that inside counsel is subject to the im-
putation of conflicts. And the only interest served by imputation in
this context is the client's strategic interest in limiting the firm's
choice of counsel. Thus, I maintain that under the facts of Koen Book,
the policy arguments favor the protection of in-firm privilege.
III. THE BENEFITS OF BROAD PROTECTION
My argument thus far has turned primarily on a criticism of the
courts' analysis in the current-client cases and on analytical arguments
for limiting the imputation of conflicts. These arguments, in turn,
rely heavily on existing exceptions to lawyers' duty of loyalty to clients,
such as the exceptions to lawyers' duty of confidentiality under Rule
1.6(b) (4) (allowing lawyers to reveal confidences in order to "secure
Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrie, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212
F.R.D. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
186 Id. at 284.
187 Id. at 286.
188 See Barker, supra note 14, at 470.
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legal advice") 189 and Rule 1.6(b) (5) (allowing lawyers to reveal confi-
dences in order to "establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer"). 190
These exceptions are controversial. The self-defense exception,
in particular, has drawn harsh criticism from some legal scholars, who
call it "scandalously self-serving"' 91 and a "slap in the face"'
192 to cli-
ents. As Professor Daniel Fischel has noted, before the 2002 amend-
ments to Rule 1.6, which expanded the grounds for permissive
disclosure of client confidences to prevent death or substantial bodily
harm, 93 lawyers were prohibited from disclosing client confidences
"to exonerate someone falsely accused of a capital crime," but "per-
fectly free to disclose confidential information when he or she is the
one accused" or to collect a fee. 194 Fischel argues that the self-defense
exception is "obviously hypocritical."'
' 95
Some readers may have a similar reaction to my proposal to pro-
tect in-firm privilege where the party seeking discovery was a client at
the time of the communication at issue. As the current-client cases
suggest, the protection of in-firm privilege in the current-client con-
text seems to fly in the face of traditional notions of lawyers' fiduciary
duty to clients. 196 Especially insofar as one doubts the independence
189 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (4) (2003).
190 Id. R. 1.6(b)(5).
191 ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 101
(1980).
192 Gilda M. Tuoni, Society Versus the Lawyers: The Strange Hierarchy of Protections of the
"New" Client Confidentiality, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 439, 469 (1993).
193 Before the 2002 amendments, Rule 1.6(b) (1) permitted lawyers to reveal client
confidences only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to prevent
the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." See STEPHEN GiuLERs & Roy D. SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 69-72 (2004) (summarizing the
legislative history of Model Rule 1.6). In 2002, Rule 1.6(b) (1) was amended to permit
disclosure "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm." See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1).
194 Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 10 (1998).
195 Id. at 12.
196 See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d
283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that "[t]he fiduciary duties of an attorney owed to a
client are very serious"); Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrie,
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that the
firm's fiduciary duty to the client "is paramount to its own interests"); In re Sunrise
Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that issues of in-firm privilege
.may cause special problems which seldom arise when other business or professional
organizations consult their in-house counsel" because of law firms' ethical and fiduci-
ary duties to clients).
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of in-house counsel generally, 197 or of law firm in-house counsel in
particular,198 one might be inclined to view in-firm privilege as a tool
for lawyers with something to hide, but unnecessary for ethical lawyers
and firms.1 99
After all, denying the privilege does not prevent lawyers from
consulting firm in-house counsel for advice about current clients. As-
suming that the lawyer seeking advice and the in-house counsel pro-
viding it both mean to follow the rules, arguably there is no need for
secrecy from the client (or anyone else). Moreover, " [i]t is well-estab-
lished that lawyers (and firms) have an ethical obligation to inform
clients when the lawyer or firm becomes aware that the client may
have a malpractice claim." 200 If lawyers are obligated to notify their
clients of any potential wrongdoing, what is the point of in-firm privi-
lege in the current-client context?
Yet these arguments ignore the traditional justifications for the
attorney-client privilege. The primary justification for the privilege in
both the individual and organizational context is "to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration ofjustice."20 1 This goal is just as important in law firms
as it is in other organizational contexts.
Moreover, even well-meaning clients need the privilege to en-
courage them to reveal questionable conduct and voice their fears
about liability. Despite the continuing academic controversy over the
usefulness of the corporate privilege in encouraging employee can-
dor,20 2 most lawyers and corporate officials believe that the privilege
197 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Bank Brussels, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (stating that "'because they are
employees of their client, and their livelihood depends on [a] single . . . client, in-
house counsel are not as independent as outside counsel,'" and "are more likely to
mix legal and business functions" (quotingJanetJ. Higley et al., Confidentiality of Com-
munications by In-House Counsel for Financial Institutions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 265, 280
(2002))).
199 Some have criticized the corporate attorney-client privilege on precisely these
grounds. See, e.g., 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302-04 (Fred
B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1978) (discussing this critique).
200 Davis, supra note 165, at 3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LAWYERS § 20 cmt. c (2000) (stating that "Ii]f the lawyer's conduct of the mat-
ter gives the client a substantial malpractice claim against the lawyer, the lawyer must
disclose that to the client").
201 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
202 See, e.g., Rice, supra note 13, at 739-42 (questioning the role of the corporate
privilege in encouraging candor by lower-level employees given that the privilege be-
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does, in fact, promote candor in attorney-client communication, 20 3 es-
pecially as to potential litigation and other "sensitive" matters.
20 4
In any case, the issue is not whether law firms should enjoy the
protection of privilege; that issue was settled with the recognition of
the corporate privilege 205 and its broad protection in Upjohn.20 6 The
issue is whether law firms should be denied the protection of in-firm
privilege when the communication at issue concerns a current client
of the firm.
This section makes a policy case for protecting in-firm privilege in
the current-client context. I begin by reviewing the Supreme Court's
arguments for broad protection of the corporate privilege in Upjohn
and show how these arguments apply equally to law firms. I then ex-
amine the emerging role of law firm in-house counsel and show how
firms' investment in in-house counsel improves law firm self-regula-
tion. I conclude by explaining how protecting the privilege based on
the guidelines proposed in Part II would encourage law firms to invest
in firm counsel to the benefit of clients and third parties as well as
firms.
A. The Need for Day-to-Day Legal Advice
As the Supreme Court noted in Upjohn, corporations are subject
to a "vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation" and thus are
in need of constant advice from lawyers about how to comply with the
law.207 Recognizing that "[t] he first step in the resolution of any legal
problem is ascertaining the factual background,"208 and that "it will
frequently be employees . . . who will possess the information
needed,"2 9 the Court rejected the narrow control group test adopted
by the Court of Appeals, which limited the privilege to communica-
tion between lawyers and corporate officials responsible for acting on
longs to the corporation and the corporation is free to waive it); Thornburg, supra
note 26, at 178-79 (same).
203 See Alexander, supra note 31, at 244 (finding that "a solid majority" of 182 New
York City corporate executives, in-house counsel, and outside counsel interviewed be-
lieved that the privilege encourages candor).
204 Id. at 266, 268-69.
205 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
206 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93 (rejecting the control group test as too narrow).
207 Id. at 392.
208 Id. at 390.
209 Id. at 391.
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legal advice, 210 and instead adopted a broader, case-by-case approach
to the privilege.
21'
According to Upjohn, a broader approach is necessary to protect
"the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's com-
pliance with the law." 212 Employees must be encouraged to come for-
ward with relevant information and to communicate openly with the
corporation's lawyer,213 and the lawyer, likewise, must have the free-
dom to give "full and frank legal advice to the employees who will put
into effect the client corporation's policy."214 The Court thus empha-
sized the role of the privilege in promoting ready access to lawyers and
day-to-day legal advice.
Access to lawyers is equally important in ensuring law firms' com-
pliance with law. Law firms, like corporations, face "a vast and compli-
cated array of regulatory legislation," where the line between
permissible and prohibited conduct is not always "an instinctive mat-
ter."21 5 In addition to state and federal law, including civil liability for
legal malpractice, lawyers also are subject to an elaborate web of pro-
fessional regulation, including state-by-state ethics rules, formal and
informal bar opinions, judicial regulation, and federal agency regula-
tion. Lawyers engaged in transnational practice face additional layers
of regulation as well as complex choice of law questions about which
regulations apply.
2 16
Moreover, the pace of regulatory development is increasing. The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983, have been
amended nearly every year since 1987 and substantially amended
210 Id. at 392-93 (stating that the control group test "frustrates the very purpose of
the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employ-
ees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client
corporation").
211 Id. at 396-97 (stating that a case-by-case approach "obeys the spirit" of the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
212 Id. at 392.
213 Id. at 391.
214 Id. at 392.
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Jay L. Krystinik, The Complex Web of Conflicting Disciplinary Standards in
International Litigation, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 815, 819-23 (2003) (discussing conflicts be-
tween the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Conduct for
Lawyers in the European Community); Stewart M. Young, Whistleblowing in a Foreign
Key: The Consistency of Ethics Regulation Under Sarbanes-Oxley with the WTO GATS Provi-
sions, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 55, 74-80 (2003) (arguing that the rules governing
corporate whistleblowing under Sarbanes-Oxley are inconsistent with the provisions
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)).
[VOL. 80:51756
THE SCOPE OF IN-FIRM PRIVILEGE
twice in the past three years alone.21 7 In 2002, Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2 18 which gave the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission unprecedented authority to create federal standards for cor-
porate lawyers' conduct.21 9 In December 2003, both the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office 220 and the Internal Revenue Service 221 issued
proposed changes to their rules of practice. And in 2005, the World
Trade Organization is scheduled to resume negotiations under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, which may dramatically af-
fect the regulation of legal services in the United States.
222
In response to the growing complexity of the law governing law-
yers, law firms increasingly are turning to ethics and professional lia-
bility specialists for advice. Though many firms continue to rely on
periodic consultation with outside counsel, large firms increasingly
are choosing to invest in in-house counsel so as to have a specialist
readily available on a day-to-day basis.
223
B. The Emerging Role of Firm Counsel
From a regulatory standpoint, the emergence of law firm in-
house counsel is a pivotal development.224 First, the ready availability
of counsel encourages lawyers to raise questions that they otherwise
might ignore. The firm counsel in our study report that lawyers come
to them with urgent questions throughout the day: "'I answer the
phone all the time .... The pace of one's practice is much different
when you've got 150 clients right there in the building who feel abso-
217 See Am. Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, at http://
www.abanet.org/ cpr/mrpc/mrpchome.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
218 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
219 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing
Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003).
220 See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,442, 69,442-562 (proposed Nov. 17, 2003) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2, 10, and 11).
221 See Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Trea-
sury Issues Rules to Increase Transparency and Halt Abusive Tax Avoidance Transac-
tions, Dec. 29, 2003, available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=118955,
00.html.
222 See Laurel S. Terry, GATS' Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and Its Poten-
tial Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 1006
(2001); Laurel S. Terry, Corrections to Laurel S. Terry, GATS'Applicability to Transnational
Lawyering and Its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 Vand. j Trans-
nat'l Law 989, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1387, 1393-94 (2002) (summarizing the
likely effects of CATS on U.S. lawyer regulation).
223 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
224 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 560 (reviewing research on the im-
portance of "in-house compliance specialists" in other regulatory contexts).
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lutely free to come in at any time . . . .' [C2] ."225 "'Every day it's a
constant flow of questions .... They don't usually take more than
fifteen minutes each but sometimes there's research to be done.'
[C31."226 "'People call me at home, and everything is an emergency.
I was going to wallpaper my office with those little yellow message
slips, all of them say 'it's an emergency, please call me in the next five
minutes.' I could work 24 hours a day. . . .' [12] ."227
Further, firm counsel tend to be professionally committed to pro-
moting compliance with ethical and legal rules. Most of the firm
counsel in our small sample (twenty-three out of thirty-two) have a
long record of service on bar committees dealing with professional
responsibility issues,228 and about a third (twelve) teach legal ethics as
adjunct professors.2 29 Several told us that they lie awake at night wor-
rying about how to increase their partners' awareness of ethical
rules.230 Thus, firm counsel tends to promote the development of
"ethical infrastructure" within firms; that is, resources and procedures
for insuring compliance with professional regulation.231 For instance,
one firm counsel in our study describes his role as follows:
I have spent an awful lot of time developing our intranet site as an
ethics and loss prevention library. We have links to every third party
source I can find, the rules of all the states .... And then the mater-
ials I have created .... I have, say, an outline on each of the major
Rules of Professional Conduct .... [I also spend time on] systems
monitoring and systems planning. That is, I spend a certain
amount of time making sure our trust account is working the way it
is supposed to .... I review-more than I care to-our marketing
materials and web site and that sort of thing .... We do a fair
amount of non-lawyer ethics training too .... [A14].232
By encouraging questions, providing resources, and monitoring
internal policies and procedures, firm counsel may dramatically im-
prove the quality of law firm self-regulation. Recognizing this, liability
225 Id. at 586.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 585.
229 Id. at 585-86 (discussing the personal and professional characteristics of firm
in-house counsel).
230 Id. at 587.
231 See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the
"Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998) (introducing the
phrase "ethical infrastructure").
232 Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 574-75.
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insurers increasingly are encouraging law firms to appoint in-house
counsel.
233
The extent to which firm counsel are able to take a proactive
role, however, depends significantly on firms' investment in the in-
house position. In some firms, the role of 'firm counsel' is an infor-
mal, volunteer role, played by the partner who takes the most interest
and is willing to donate the time. Such service is viewed as one way to
fulfill partners' administrative duties to the firm. 234 Consider the fol-
lowing comments from partners who volunteer in their firms: "'You're
expected as an attorney, and then as a partner, to pick up administra-
tive duties around the firm, and that was one of the things I ended up
doing.' [B1]." 235 "'I have taken the title of ethics partner just to have
something to call myself, but I have never been officially appointed
anything.' [A4] ."2
3 6
In such firms, the lawyer who acts as firm counsel may volunteer
upwards of 500 hours per year to in-house advising 237 as a "labor of
love";23 8 however, most of that time necessarily is spent responding to
day-to-day questions rather than proactively monitoring the firm's
compliance with professional regulation. 239  As one volunteer
complained:
The 500 hours, I would tell you, on a year-to-year basis, over maybe
the last 10 years, is almost all reactive time .... It's sort of one of my
complaints, because it doesn't give me much chance, or anyone in
the firm much chance, to spend time thinking proactively about
policies and procedures. We probably have some gaps as a result of
that. [C2].240
Other firms have created formal, compensated in-house posi-
tions, with titles such as "general counsel," "ethics advisor," "conflicts
233 The Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society (ALAS) requires insureds to desig-
nate a loss prevention partner to serve as a liaison between ALAS and the firm. Eliza-
beth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 335, 347 (2003). In some firms, this role has evolved into a broader
firm counsel position. See id. at 347-49 (discussing the role of ALAS in promoting the
appointment of law firm in-house counsel). Other insurers offer discounts on liability
premiums for firms with in-house counsel. See Glater, supra note 1; Levy, supra note
1, at 28.
234 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 571-72 (discussing the effect of firm
management philosophy on the structure of the in-house position).
235 Id. at 572.
236 Id. at 565.
237 Id. at 574 (providing examples).
238 Id. at 585 (quoting several firm counsel who used this term).
239 Id. at 573-74 (examining the role of unpaid firm counsel).
240 Id. at 574.
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partner," and the like.24 1 Typically, the lawyers who hold these posi-
tions began as practicing partners in the firm who volunteered as in-
house advisors and eventually had their service recognized with a for-
mal title and direct compensation. 242 In some firms, the in-house po-
sition is a full-time position such that the partner who holds it gives up
all outside practice. As one full-time general counsel reports: "'I'm
still a partner but I have given up my rights to be compensated like a
partner. In fact, I'm incentivized not to practice at all [for outside
clients].' [BIll ].243 In other firms, in-house counsel bills the firm for
in-house matters, but also maintains an outside practice, 244 often spe-
cializing in litigation or ethics and professional liability matters.
245
Not surprisingly, the lawyers in formal positions, who are com-
pensated directly for in-house advising, tend to define the role more
broadly and devote more time and attention to it than partners who
provide in-house advising as a volunteer sideline to a full outside prac-
tice.2 46 Volunteers tend to focus primarily on conflicts questions and
the occasional claim and most describe their role as reactive. 247 As
one partner explains: "'Conflicts tend to dominate because it is regu-
lar and it is always there. There are also big money issues and usually
somebody is getting disappointed or there is the potential for that.'
[A8] ."248
Paid in-house counsel, by contrast, deal with a host of ethics and
regulatory issues 249 and tend to be more proactive, going door to door
(and even city to city) to answer questions, provide training, and re-
view firm policies and procedures. 250 One full-time firm counsel re-
ports: "'I spend at least two days a month in each of our other offices.
And when I'm in [our main office], I'm constantly just walking
around the floors. I've knocked on doors rather than having people
241 Id. at 565-66 (reporting the most common titles used for the in-house
position).
242 Id. at 565-70, 573 (discussing the "evolutionary" nature of the in-house
position).
243 Id. at 573.
244 Id. at 572-73 (noting that hours billed to the firm for in-house matters are
compensated equally as hours billed to outside clients).
245 Id. at 585 (discussing firm counsels' practice specialties).
246 Id. at 573-77 (examining the effect of direct compensation on the scope of in-
house advising).
247 Id. at 573-74.
248 Id. at 574.
249 Id. at 574-75; see alsoJarvis & Fucile, supra note 9, at 105-08 (describing the
scope of their in-house roles).
250 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 588-89.
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come to see me .... I have the luxury of time to be able to do that.'
[A I I]."251
In part, of course, firms' level of investment in the in-house coun-
sel position is a function of firm size. Small firms may be unlikely to
need permanent full- or even part-time firm counsel, and may be less
likely to compensate partners for ad hoc advising (although there is
no evidence of this point). Some readers of an earlier draft of this
Article were critical of using direct compensation as a criterion for in-
firm privilege, arguing that it would disadvantage small firms. In re-
sponse to this criticism, I softened my original insistence on direct
compensation and suggested additional means of establishing an at-
torney-client relationship, such as time recording and the formal an-
nouncement of firm counsel's identity.
25 2
Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the significance of
firm size as a determinant of firms' appetite for self-regulation. Our
study of firms ranging in size from seventy-five to 1000-plus lawyers
253
found that firms' investment in the in-house position was not directly
correlated with size, but rather appeared to depend significantly on
firm culture and management philosophy. For instance, of the eleven
firms in our sample with more than 500 lawyers, six compensate in-
house counsel and four do not (information for one firm is miss-
ing).254 Likewise, of the ten firms with full-time in-house counsel, six
have fewer than 500 lawyers and two have fewer than 250 lawyers.
255
Thus, as one firm counsel remarked, "'[t] he decision as to how to
deal with ethical issues . . . is not dictated by the quantum of the
work.' [B2] .,"256 Instead, it appears that the level of firm investment
determines the scope and substance of the issues that get addressed.
Consider the following comments by two full-time firm counsel:
The thing I notice is there's a lot more [in-house] business now that
we have made a resource available . . . [W]e used to have a system
where two of us would spend about 500 hours a year on conflicts,
and maybe a third of that time on other professional responsibility
matters. Now, in my new [full-time] position, I am astounded that I
can't get everything done in a day and I don't think there are a lot
of different issues than there used to be when we spent 1,000 hours
on this. [All].
251 Id. at 588.
252 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
253 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
254 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 576-77 (discussing the effects of firm
size).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 577.
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What occurs to me as I am sitting here listening is there is no
industry standard for this .... I don't know how many times I have
said to either myself or a colleague: "I don't believe this firm goes to
this length to deal with an ethics issue," or "I can't believe that this
firm doesn't go to this length" . . . . The spectrum is so broad.
[Al2] .257
C. Promoting Investment in Firm In-House Counsel
My proposed approach to defining the scope of in-firm privilege
vis-a-vis current clients is designed in part to reward law firms that in-
vest directly in the in-house position. By conditioning exception to
the imputation of conflicts under Rule 1.10 on structural indicators
such as formal appointment and direct compensation, I hope to pro-
mote the formal appointment and direct compensation of firm in-
house counsel. As our study shows, formal investment by firms con-
tributes directly to firm counsels' efforts to promote compliance with
professional regulation.
My approach also is designed to encourage firms and firm coun-
sel to take seriously the firm's identity as the client and the profes-
sional duties associated with the organization as client. Our study
revealed several questions on this front. For instance, should firm
counsel ever represent individual members of the firm in disciplinary
proceedings? (The firm counsel in our study were split on this issue,
which suggests a blurring of the identity of the firm as client.) Can
firm counsel promise confidentiality to associates who want to report a
partner's misconduct? (Again, a split; though most said no.) Do firm
counsel have a duty to report firm members' misconduct under Rule
8.3258 or Rule 1.13?259 Could firm counsel be liable for a failure to
disclose? (We conducted the study before the 2003 changes to Rule
257 Id
258 Compare MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2003) (requiring lawyers
to report any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that "raises a substantial
question" as to the lawyer's "honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects"), with id. R. 8.3(c) (stating "[t]his Rule does not require disclosure of infor-
mation otherwise protected by Rule 1.6"), and id. R. 8.3 cmt. 4 (stating "[t]he duty to
report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a
lawyer whose professional misconduct is in question").
259 See id. R. 1.13(b) (requiring organizational lawyers to report up the ladder
certain kinds of illegal conduct by an organization member); id. R. 1.13(c) (allowing
organizational lawyers to report out organizational fraud under certain
circumstances).
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1.13,260 thus these questions were not systematically addressed.)
Though these are issues for a separate paper, this short list highlights
the importance of formal investment in the firm counsel role.
One might argue that investing in firm in-house counsel is in law
firms' economic self-interest; thus, we need not hold out the privilege
as a carrot. However, law firms are notoriously under-managed.
261
Despite their increasing exposure to professional liability, most firms
invest very little in monitoring internal compliance with professional
regulation. 262 Indeed, much of the impetus for firms' existing invest-
ment in in-house counsel and other ethical infrastructure stems from
the demands of liability insurers263 rather than rational management
by firms.
Further, law firms, as entities, are unregulated under the profes-
sional rules of most states. 264 Despite repeated proposals for "law firm
discipline,' 265 the American Bar Association has resisted the direct
regulation of law firms on the grounds that entity regulation would
260 In response to a series of corporate scandals, and pressure from Congress and
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the ABA House of Delegates amended the
reporting requirements for organizational lawyers under Rule 1.13. For an annotated
summary of the changes, see GiLLERs & SIMON, supra note 193, at 143-56.
261 S.S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons from Manage-
ment Theory, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 645, 645 (1990) (arguing that law firms have serious
organizational and management problems); Joel A. Rose, Who Makes the Best Lawyer
Manager? Lawyer Managers Must Balance the Concerns of Firms and Attorneys, LEGAL INTEL-
LIGENCER, Apr. 17, 2000, at 7 (reporting that only two firms participating in an infor-
mal survey of twenty firms had full-time managing partners); On-line Roundtable,
Learningfrom Baker & McKenzie, Am. LAw., Oct. 1994, at 83 (discussing large law firms'
resistance to full-time, specialized management).
262 See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastruc-
ture in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691,
692-702 (2002) (reviewing research on the prevalence and effectiveness of various
types of ethical infrastructure within law firms and concluding that a large majority of
law firms lack adequate internal procedures for insuring ethics and regulatory
compliance).
263 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 560, 590; Glater, supra note 1; Levy,
supra note 1, at 28 (discussing the role of liability insurers in promoting investment in
firm in-house counsel).
264 The two exceptions are New Jersey and New York. See NJ. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUcr R. 5.1 (a) (1984) (requiring law firms to make "reasonable efforts to ensure
that member lawyers . . .undertake measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct"); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 1-104 (1996) (requiring firms to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that
all lawyers in the firm conform to the disciplinary rules").
265 See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1977) (calling for entity regulation under Model Rule 5.1(a)).
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undermine individual partner accountability. 266 Thus, the profession
cannot compel law firms to invest in adequate internal controls, or
even to designate someone to be responsible for monitoring internal
controls. 267 In short, in other words, there is no "stick."
I do not claim that protecting the privilege in the current-client
context suddenly will prompt under-managed law firms to appoint
paid in-house counsel (though it might). However, the denial of priv-
ilege in this context almost certainly will have a chilling effect. Unlike
nonlawyer executives 268 and lower-level corporate employees, 269 who
may not be aware of the doctrinal boundaries of the attorney-client
privilege, lawyers are likely to understand the implications of the
courts' position, and firm counsel, especially, are keenly aware.
270
Given the current underinvestment in ethical infrastructure
within firms and the profession's continuing reluctance to regulate
law firms directly, it hardly makes sense to stifle the efforts that firms
do make to promote ethical and regulatory compliance by denying
those efforts the protection of privilege in a misplaced effort to pro-
266 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 233, at 335-38 (reviewing the law firm
discipline debate). Model Rule 5.1 places responsibility for law firm regulation on law
partners, individually and collectively, but does not include a provision for the direct
regulation of firms. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.1 (2003). Rule 5.1(a)
states:
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving rea-
sonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.
Id.
267 See Elizabeth Chambliss, MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity Regula-
tion, 4 LEcAL ETHICS 45, 61 (2002) (calling for the ABA to amend the comment to
Rule 5.1 (a) to include an explicit reference to the benefits of firm in-house counsel);
Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 233, at 346-50 (2003) (arguing that the formal ap-
pointment of firm in-house counsel is critical to the success of law firm self-
regulation).
268 See Alexander, supra note 31, at 359 (reporting that most corporate executives,
while aware of the privilege, do not understand the Garner doctrine or know that it
exists).
269 Id. at 266, 315 (finding that most lower-level employees know very little about
the privilege).
270 The two most recent current-client cases prompted immediate criticism from
professional liability specialists. See, e.g., Barker, supra note 14, at 470-71 (Barker is a
partner and professional liability specialist at Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP);
Richmond, supra note 100, at 90-94 (Richmond is Senior Vice President, Professional
Services Group, Aon Risk Services); Davis, supra note 165 (Davis is a professional lia-
bility specialist and a past president of the Association of Professional Responsibility
Lawyers).
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mote loyalty to clients. The emergence of in-house counsel in law
firms is the most promising development in years for improving self-
regulation by law firms. In the long run, clients collectively stand to
benefit far more from firms' investment in in-house counsel than
from sporadic access to in-firm communication in lawyer-client dis-
putes. The profession and the courts should do everything possible to
encourage law firms to invest in firm counsel and to shape the role of
firm in-house counsel to serve the interests of professional regulation.
CONCLUSION
We have trouble defining the ethical duties of in-house counsel.
Some countries prohibit the private employment of lawyers alto-
gether, viewing such employment as fatal to lawyers' professional inde-
pendence.2 71 In the United States, too, corporate counsel initially
were viewed as "kept lawyers" 272 who "had not quite made the grade as
partner"273 and were all too likely to behave unethically in the inter-
ests of their corporate masters. In the 1920s, some bar leaders and
scholars claimed that the trend toward "house lawyers" threatened the
viability of the profession.
274
Today, of course, the tables have turned, and corporate counsel
have become the masters-at least relative to their law firm counter-
parts. Corporate counsel control the division of work between inside
and outside counsel; they control the selection of lawyers and firms
invited to bid on and perform outside work; and they supervise the
performance of outside counsel. 275 Compensation for general coun-
271 See R. E. Rosen, In-House Counsel, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SocAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2851, 2852 (2001) (stating that "[i)n many civil law
countries, a lawyer must resign from the bar before taking salaried employment"). In
France, in-house counsel are barred from appearing in court. See Carlos ViladdsJene,
The Legal Profession in Spain: An Understudied but Booming Occupation, in 2 LAWYERS IN
SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAw WoRLD 376 (Richard L. Abel & Philip C.S. Lewis eds., 1988)
(comparing in-house counsel in France and Spain).
272 Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organi-
zational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 n.1 (1989) (tracing the evolution of profes-
sional labels from "kept lawyer" in the 1920s to "house counsel" in the 1930s to
.corporate counsel" today).
273 Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 (1985) (stating that "[t]he traditional house counsel was a
relatively minor management figure, stereotypically, a lawyer from the corporation's
principal outside law firm who had not quite made the grade as partner").
274 Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 449, 458 n.53 (1988).
275 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 273, at 289-93 (discussing corporate general
counsels' management of outside counsel); see also Rosen, supra note 271, at 484-86.
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sel in the largest U.S. companies exceeds that of most law firm
partners.
276
Corporate counsel also play an increasingly important role in cor-
porate self-regulation. In addition to "the valuable efforts of corpo-
rate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with law,"277 recent
scandals highlight the importance of corporate counsels' duty to pro-
tect shareholders and the public from fraud and other corporate mis-
conduct.278 The precise boundaries of corporate counsels' duty to
report organizational misconduct promises to be a lively topic in years
to come.
The emergence of in-house counsel in law firms raises many of
the same ethical issues that are found in the corporate context, as well
as unique issues stemming from law firms' own fiduciary duty to cli-
ents. The adjudication of firm counsels' various professional responsi-
bilities-to the law firm, its clients and the public-will significantly
affect law firms' investment in the firm counsel position as well as firm
counsels' authority and effectiveness within firms.
This Article has argued for broad protection of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege between law firm in-house counsel and other members
of the firm, claiming that such protection will promote investment in
the firm counsel position and thereby improve the effectiveness of law
firm self-regulation. Given the high ethical standards of the firm
counsel in our study, and the role of firm counsel in promoting the
development of ethical infrastructure within firms, promoting firm
counsel seems a promising strategy for promoting law firms' attention
to and compliance with professional regulation.
In pitching for broad protection of in-firm privilege, however, I
am mindful of academic and judicial concerns about abuse of the cor-
porate privilege 2 7 9 as well as the notable failure of corporate counsel
to guard the public interest in the case of Enron and other recent
276 See Eriq Gardner, Bottoms Up, CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2003, at 78, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1058416383413 (reporting that the
average salary and bonus package for the top 100 general counsel in the Fortune 500
exceeded one million dollars in 2002, not counting stock options); Michael T. Burr,
The 2004 In-House Counsel Compensation Report, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2004, at 28,
34, available at http://www.cltmag.com/editorial/surveys/04-Mar.pdf (reporting sala-
ries and bonuses for fifty of the highest paid general counsel in 2002).
277 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
278 See Robert W. Gordon, A Ne-' Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1210 (2003) (calling for the creation of a special profes-
sional role called "Independent Counselor" with a "distinct governance regime of eth-
ical codes, liability and malpractice rules, special statutory duties and privileges, and
judicial rules of practice").
279 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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scandals. 280 Law firms' reliance on in-house counsel carries responsi-
bilities as well as privileges, and the balance between firm counsels'
duties to the firm, its clients, and the public cannot be established in
the abstract, or for all time. Thus, as we move forward in defining the
duties of law firm in-house counsel, we must learn from our successes
and failures in the corporate context and take care to test our regula-
tory strategies against the actual practices of firm counsel and firms.
280 See Gordon, supra note 278, at 1185-90 (detailing examples of professional
failure and wrongdoing by lawyers for Enron).
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